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CASE NOTE ON JACOB V SAVE BEELIAR WETLANDS (INC): 
MANDATORY RELEVANT CONSIDERATIONS, ADMINISTRATIVE 




Martin CJ’s judgment in Save Beeliar Wetlands v Jacob1 created a significant degree 
of uncertainty for many state departments and statutory bodies. The primary 
implication being that published policies were potentially mandatory relevant 
considerations in their administrative decision making processes. It presaged the 
urgent review of many such policies to avoid future challenges from similarly 
disgruntled parties. 
 
The Court of Appeal of the Supreme Court of Western Australia’s unanimous 
decision in Jacob v Save Beeliar Wetlands (Inc)2 has somewhat remedied that 
uncertainty. 
 
McLure P, in a judgment affirmed by both Buss and Newnes JJA, overturned Martin 
CJ’s judgment. That judgment considered the Environmental Protection Authority’s 
(EPA) recommendation for approval of the proposal to extend the Roe Highway 
through the Beeliar Wetlands. It also considered the subsequent approval by the 
Minister. The EPA was found to have fallen into jurisdictional error. The Chief 
Justice held that the EPA had failed to take into account its own published policies 
                                                 
* Final year LLB student, University of Notre Dame Australia. 
1 Save Beeliar Wetlands (Inc) v Jacob [2015] WASC 482 (16 December 2015) (‘Save Beeliar 
Wetlands’). 
2 Jacob v Save Beeliar Wetlands (Inc) (2016) 216 LGERA 201 (‘Jacob’). 
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when it recommended the approval. This failure rendered the recommendation and 
the approval invalid, and amounted to a denial of procedural fairness.3 
 
On appeal, McLure P identified three contentions that required determination. 
Firstly, that the EPA was obligated to consider its own policies in making its 
assessment and recommendation.4 Secondly, that it was legally unreasonable that it 
had not, in fact, done so.5 Finally, that it had failed to properly question the 
environmental acceptability of allowing the implementation of the project using 
offsets, given the significance of the affected areas.6 
 
The Court of Appeal determined that the EPA Policies were not ‘mandatory relevant 
considerations’.7 Hence, the process by which the EPA had made its 
recommendation was not legally unreasonable;8 the correct question had been asked 
and answered.9 On that basis the Court allowed the appeal.10 
 
I  FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
 
In April 2009 a proposal to extend the Roe Highway from the Kwinana Freeway to 
Stock Road was submitted by the Commissioner for Main Roads Western Australia 
to the EPA for assessment. The area within which much of the extension is situated 
has been designated in the Metropolitan Region Scheme since 1963. 
                                                 
3 Save Beeliar Wetlands [2015] WASC 482 (16 December 2015) [181], [186]. 
4 Jacob (2016) 216 LGERA 201, 213 [62]. 
5 Ibid 213 [63]. 
6 Ibid 217 [83]. 
7 Ibid 213 [61]. 
8 Ibid 216-7 [82]. 
9 Ibid 218 [88]. 
10 Ibid 218 [89]. 
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The proposed path of the extension traverses several significant areas of wetland that 
make up the Beeliar Regional Park, and includes Conservation Category Wetlands11. 
The project is expected to result in the clearing of over 70 hectares of foraging 
habitat of both the Carnaby’s and Red-tailed Black Cockatoos, and 2.5 hectares of 
nesting habitat of the Black Cockatoo. It will also fragment the remaining habitat. 
The role of the EPA in environmental assessments is defined in the Environmental 
Protection Act 1986 (WA) (‘EPA Act’). Section 44 requires the EPA to provide a 
report to the Minister for Environment (‘the Minister’) regarding its assessment 
findings, upon receipt of which the Minister then makes the final decision regarding 
approval of the proposal. 
In February 2003 the EPA had published Bulletin 108812 in which it advised the then 
Minister that, inter alia: 
the EPA is of the opinion that the overall impacts of construction within the road reserve, or 
any alignment through the Beeliar Regional Park in the vicinity of North Lake and Bibra 
Lake, would lead to the ecological values of the area as a whole being diminished in the 
long-term. Every effort should be made to avoid this. 
In January 2006 the EPA published Position Statement No. 913 in which it defined 
the comprehensive decision-making process to be followed when environmental 
offsets are being considered. The statement enunciated a series of questions that were 
to be addressed in evaluating what, if any, offsets were to be recommended. 
                                                 
11 ‘CCWs [Conservation Category Wetlands] are high priority wetlands which support a high level of 
environmental attributes and functions ...’ Jacob v Save Beeliar Wetlands (Inc) (2016) 216 LGERA 
201, 205 [11] (McLure P). 
12 Environmental Protection Authority of Western Australia, Bulletin 1088, Environmental values 
associated with the alignment of Roe Highway (Stage 8), February 2003. 
13 Environmental Protection Authority of Western Australia, Position Statement, Environmental 
Offsets – Position Statement No. 9, January 2006. 
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In September 2008 the EPA published Guidance Statement No. 1914 which addressed 
the specific issue of biodiversity with respect to environmental offsets. Whilst 
generally consistent with the earlier Position Statement No. 9, there was an exception 
noted. A proposal with significant residual impact might nonetheless be allowed to 
implement offsets if it was deemed not to be unacceptable. 
 
In the same month the EPA published Environmental Protection Bulletin No 115 
which also traversed the requirements of environmental offsets with respect to 
biodiversity. Of particular significance, it stated that ‘the EPA adopts a presumption 
against recommending approval of proposed projects where significant adverse 
environmental impacts affect ‘critical’ assets.’16 
 
The EPA Roe Highway Extension Assessment Report17 was delivered to the Minister 
in September 2013. It concluded that the project could be delivered in such a manner 
as to meet the EPA’s required environmental objectives with the implementation of a 
number of conditions,18 one of which was the establishment of appropriate offsets for 
‘the significant residual impacts to fauna, vegetation and wetlands (Condition 12).’19 
Importantly, in Condition 12 the EPA recommended that the power to determine the 
necessary requirements for a Land Acquisition and Management Plan (LAMP) and 
its timing, be delegated to the CEO. The minimum parameters for the LAMP were 
                                                 
14 Environmental Protection Authority of Western Australia, Guidance Statement, Guidance for the 
Assessment of Environmental Factors – Environmental Offsets – Biodiversity No. 19, September 
2008. 
15 Environmental Protection Authority of Western Australia, Bulletin No 1, Environmental Offsets, 
September 2008. 
16 Ibid 2. 
17 Environmental Protection Authority of Western Australia, Assessment Report, Report and 
recommendations of the Environmental Protection Authority – Roe Highway Extension – Report 
1489, 3 September 2013 (‘Assessment Report’). 
18 Ibid vi. 
19 Ibid viii. 
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specified so as to at least address the losses expected to arise from the extension 
works. 
 
A total of 165 appeals were lodged against the Assessment Report which included 
appeals from each of the applicants in Save Beeliar Wetlands. The Minister 
ultimately determined those appeals, made some amendments to the proposed 
conditions and published his final approval on 2 July 2015. 
 
II THE PRIMARY CHALLENGE: SAVE BEELIAR WETLANDS (INC) V JACOB 
 
The applicants in the primary case were Save Beeliar Wetlands (Inc), an incorporated 
association, and Carole de Barre. Ms de Barre was a local resident whose interests 
were conceded by the respondents to be directly affected by the decision under 
review, and therefore her standing was recognised. A determination regarding the 
standing of Save Beeliar Wetlands (Inc) was therefore unnecessary. 
 
The applicants sought judicial review of the decision of the EPA to provide the 
Assessment Report to the Minister and therein recommend the approval of the 
proposal subject to specified conditions. They also sought judicial review of the 
Minister’s subsequent conditional approval. 
 
Martin CJ comprehensively reviewed the EPA Act in particular identifying the 
independence of the EPA from the Minister.20 The Chief Justice also canvassed the 
EPA’s functions21 and powers,22 the generation of environmental protection 
                                                 
20 Save Beeliar Wetlands [2015] WASC 482 (16 December 2015) [16]. 
21 Ibid [18]. 
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policies,23 the conduct of environmental impact assessments24 and the appeals 
process against such assessments.25 
 
It is interesting to note that the Chief Justice identified that where the Minister 
approves an EPA draft policy, that ‘policy has the force of law as though it had been 
enacted as part of the [EPA] Act’.26  Yet he concedes that ‘it is not contended that 
any policy formulated in accordance with the provisions of this Part of the Act has 
any relevance to the issues in these proceedings’.27 
 
A Grounds for Review 
 
Martin CJ identified ‘five distinct albeit related grounds’28 of review with respect to 
the decision of the EPA which arise from three of the four grounds enumerated in the 
applicants’ claim. The applicants’ fourth ground challenged the validity of the 
Minister’s ultimate approval. The Chief Justice labelled that claim ‘entirely 
parasitic’29 in so far as it would succeed in the event that any of the other three 
grounds did so. The grounds and Martin CJ’s determinations regarding each are 
considered below. 
 
1 Could Offsets Provide Environmental Acceptability? 
 
The applicants claimed that the EPA was required to: 
                                                                                                                                          
22 Ibid [19]. 
23 Ibid [20]-[24]. 
24 Ibid [25]-[31]. 
25 Ibid [32]-[33]. 
26 Ibid [24]. 
27 Ibid [20]. 
28 Ibid [106]. 
29 Ibid [105]. 
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address, separately and discretely, the question of whether the Proposal is environmentally 
unacceptable irrespective of any conditions which might be attached to the implementation 
before addressing the question of the adequacy of any environmental offsets30 
 
Martin CJ held that such separate consideration was not a requirement of the EPA 
Act, and more importantly that the power to recommend a proposal that actually 
required environmental offsets was expressly conferred in s 44. There were no 
provisions in the EPA Act that supported this ground of review and it was therefore 
disallowed. 
 
2 Failure to Take Account of a Mandatory Relevant Consideration 
 
The applicants claimed that the EPA was jurisdictionally bound to take account of its 
own publically proclaimed policies in the environmental assessment process. In 
particular, the policy that had been published in Position Statement No 9, Guidance 
Statement No 19 and Environmental Protection Bulletin No 1 was not considered. 
Martin CJ identified this ground as potentially raising three separate important legal 
questions with respect to the exercise of statutory power. Firstly, would the decision-
maker actually exceed jurisdiction by considering the policy? Secondly, was the 
decision-maker jurisdictionally bound to consider the policy? Thirdly, was the 
decision-maker not only required to consider the policy but also to apply it without 
deviation? 
Martin CJ quoted Mason J in Minister for Aboriginal Affairs v Peko-Wallsend Ltd,31 
who held that ‘[w]hat factors a decision-maker is bound to consider in making the 
                                                 
30 Ibid [109]. 
31 Minister for Aboriginal Affairs v Peko-Wallsend Ltd (1986) 162 CLR 24, 39–40 (‘Peko-Wallsend’). 
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decision is determined by construction of the statute conferring the discretion.’32 The 
Chief Justice then noted that the EPA Act did not expressly require that such policies 
be considered in exercising the powers conferred upon the EPA.33 
Martin CJ reviewed seven Federal Court cases34 and two Western Australian cases35 
and distilled from them that: 
a policy formulated by an administrative decision-maker is a mandatory relevant 
consideration in the sense that the decision-maker is required to take that policy into account 
as a condition of the valid exercise of his or her jurisdiction.36 
 
The Chief Justice did, however, concede that there had been no precedent discovered 
at ‘an intermediate Court of Appeal or higher which supports that general 
proposition.’37 
 
Martin CJ then applied what he termed ‘the more orthodox approach enunciated by 
Mason J in Peko-Wallsend38 to determine whether the proposition could be ‘derived 
by implication from the subject matter, scope and purpose of the [EPA] Act.’39 
Following a comprehensive review of the relevant sections of the EPA Act, in 
particular Part IV which deals with the conduct of an environmental assessment per 
se, the Chief Justice concluded that such was in fact the case and that the issue then 
                                                 
32 Save Beeliar Wetlands [2015] WASC 482 (16 December 2015) [128]. 
33 Ibid [129]. 
34 Drake v Minister for Immigration & Ethnic Affairs (No 1) (1979) 24 ALR 577; Drake v Minister for 
Immigration & Ethnic Affairs (No 2) (1979) 2 ALD 634 (1 January 1979); Gerah Imports Pty Ltd v 
Minister for Industry, Technology and Commerce (1987) 17 FCR 1; Nikac v Minister for Immigration 
and Ethnic Affairs (1988) 20 FCR 65; BHP Direct Reduced Iron Pty Ltd v CEO, Australian Customs 
Service (1998) 55 ALD 665 (23 October 1998); Minister for Immigration, Local Government and 
Ethnic Affairs v Gray (1994) 50 FCR 189; Minister for Foreign Affairs v Lee (2014) 227 FCR 279. 
35 Clive Elliott Jennings & Co Pty Ltd v Western Australian Planning Commission [2002] WASCA 
276 (10 October 2002); Tah Land Pty Ltd v Western Australian Planning Commission [2009] WASC 
196 (17 July 2009). 
36 Save Beeliar Wetlands [2015] WASC 482 (16 December 2015) [150] (citations omitted). 
37 Ibid. 
38 Ibid [151]. 
39 Ibid. 
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became one of fact. Had the EPA taken its own published policies into 
consideration? 
 
It is interesting to note that in determining this ground Martin CJ identified that the 
EPA’s consideration of its own policies in administrative decision-making was a 
matter of procedural fairness. He stated that ‘the requirements of procedural fairness 
are unlikely to be met’ in the event that the EPA was not required to do so.40 
 
The respondents had conceded that the evidence was uncontroversial and that the 
EPA had ‘failed to take account of the policy enunciated in the three published 
policy statements upon which the applicant relies.’41 
 
Martin CJ found, therefore, that this ground of review was proven and that the EPA 
assessment report was invalid. As a consequence the Minister’s decision was also 
invalid. The Chief Justice directed the EPA to determine what was needed to rectify 
their process and provide an assessment report that was compliant with the EPA Act. 
 
3 Inadequate Reasons for the EPA’s Acceptance of Offsets 
 
Martin CJ stated that this ground was submitted only as an alternative to the previous 
ground. He found that the problem with the assessment report was not that the 
reasons provided in it were inadequate, but that the process of assessment was 
inadequate. Given, however, that the previous ground was upheld there was no 
requirement to adjudicate on the statutory need for the EPA to provide its reasons. 
                                                 
40 Ibid [186]. 
41 Ibid [189]. 
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4 Environmental Factors Considered in Isolation? 
 
The applicants submitted that the EPA had assessed the impact of the key 
environmental factors individually and not cumulatively. The proposition was that 
the EPA Act42 directed the EPA to evaluate a proposal ‘in its entirety.’43 This 
interpretation was not controversial.44 However, Martin CJ dismissed this ground on 
the basis that the content of the assessment report included paragraphs wherein: (i) 
all residual impacts; and (ii) all of the proposed offsets; were collated. He found that 
the claim was therefore rebutted by the very structure of the assessment report.45 
 
5 The EPA Proposed that the Minister Empower the CEO to Permit 
Construction 
 
The applicants claimed that the inclusion of the clause empowering the CEO of the 
EPA to permit the commencement of construction was a ‘constructive failure to 
exercise the jurisdiction conferred upon the EPA by Part IV of the [EPA] Act.’46 
Martin CJ dismissed this ground on the basis that the recommendation did not alter 
the conditional requirements imposed upon the proponents of the proposal and did 
not empower the CEO to alter those requirements. 
 
B The Judgment 
 
Martin CJ dismissed four of the five grounds that he had enunciated, and upheld only 
the ground that the EPA had failed to take into account a mandatory relevant 
                                                 
42 EPA Act s 44. 
43 Save Beeliar Wetlands [2015] WASC 482 (16 December 2015) [216]. 
44 Ibid. 
45 Ibid [222]. 
46 Ibid [225]. 
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consideration. This invalidated the assessment report recommendations and therefore 
the Minister’s decision which was predicated on that recommendation. 
 
The decision had significant ramifications for both existing approved projects as well 
as future proposals, and of particular concern were those projects that proposed to 
utilise offsets to gain approval.47 There was general recognition that the decision 
‘reinforced the critical need for decision-makers to understand their legislative 
obligations.’48 
 
A clear implication for government departments and statutory bodies was that their 
policies might be considered mandatory relative considerations in any future 
proposal assessment. This necessitated both sides (proponents and decision-makers) 
to carefully consider such policies and their consequences for the project under 
review.49 
III THE APPEAL: JACOB V SAVE BEELIAR WETLANDS (INC) 
 
The State Government, not surprisingly, appealed the judgment on the ground that 
Martin CJ had erred in law when he determined that the EPA Policies were a 
mandatory relevant consideration.50 
 
                                                 
47 Sally Audeyev, Lee McIntosh and Sarah De Ceglie, Ignore EPA policies at your peril (9 March 
2016) King & Wood Mallesons, 3 <http://www.kwm.com/en/au/knowledge/insights/epa-policies-wa-
supreme- court-roe-8-highway-project-20160308.> 
48 Andre Maynard, ‘Environmental policies: summary of Save Beeliar Wetlands (Inc) v Jacob [2015] 
WASC 482’ (2016) 3(1) Australian Environmental Law Digest 5, 6 
<http://search.informit.com.au.ipacez.nd.edu.au/documentSummary;dn=999644404981242;res=IELH
SS>. 
49 Audeyev, McIntosh and De Ceglie, above n 47, 2. 
50 Jacob (2016) 216 LGERA 201. 
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The respondent, Save Beeliar Wetlands (Inc), argued to have Martin CJ’s decision 
upheld on three grounds, two of which had not been raised in the primary case. 
Somewhat unexpectedly, the Government elected not to object to the inclusion of the 
new claims.The Court’s findings on the respondent’s three grounds of appeal shall be 
considered prior to the discussion of the final appeal judgment. 
 
A The Respondent’s Grounds 
The respondent argued that there were three additional grounds upon which to 
uphold Martin CJ’s judgment that the EPA Assessment Report was invalid. 
 
1 2002 Administrative Procedures 
The respondent claimed that the Environmental Impact Assessment (Part IV Division 
1) Administrative Procedures 2002 (WA) (the Administrative Procedures) required 
that the EPA must consider its published policies when conducting environmental 
assessments. This requirement was said to arise pursuant to Clause 9.4.1(j) wherein it 
is stated that: 
The EPA may consider information from one or more of the following sources in assessing 
the proposal – 
… 
(j) relevant environmental policies, standards and criteria;51 
The Court found, based upon the principles of statutory interpretation, that the 
policies were a ‘permissive relevant consideration.’52 The clearly expressed intention 
that the EPA may, not must, consider relevant environmental policies precludes such 
a requirement being a mandatory relevant consideration. 
                                                 
51 Environmental Impact Assessment (Part IV Division 1) Administrative Procedures 2002 (WA) s 
9(4)(1); quoted in Jacob (2016) 216 LGERA 201, 210 [43]. 
52 Jacob (2016) 216 LGERA 201, 213 [62]. 
(2016) 18 UNDALR 
172 
 
2 Legal Unreasonableness 
The respondents claimed that the EPA’s decision-making process was legally 
unreasonable, and constituted jurisdictional error.53 They citied both Minister for 
Immigration and Citizenship v Li54 (Li) and Minister for Immigration and Border 
Protection v Eden.55 
 
The Court cited Li and stated that ‘legal reasonableness provides the boundaries of 
the area within which the decision-maker has a genuinely free discretion (citations 
omitted)’56 and that such boundaries were to be ascertained by reference to ‘the 
scope, subject matter and purpose of the statutory discretionary power (citations 
omitted).’57 
 
The Court interpreted the respondent’s claim to mean that ‘“without a reason” [the 
EPA] did not have regard to its Policies.’58 However the Court, having already 
determined that such consideration was permissive, found that ‘[t]here can be no 
obligation to give an explanation about why it did not take into account something it 
was not obliged to.’59 
 
The respondent had further argued that the Policies contained two presumptions 
against the approval of proposals where there would be ‘a significant residual impact 
                                                 
53 Ibid 213-4 [64]. 
54 Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Li (2013) 249 CLR 332. 
55 Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Eden (2016) 240 FCR 158. 
56 Jacob (2016) 216 LGERA 201, 214 [68]. 
57 Ibid. 
58 Jacob (2016) 216 LGERA 201, 215 [70]. 
59 Ibid. 
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on critical assets (citations omitted)’ and where such impacts were ‘being 
counterbalanced by offsets (citations omitted).’60 
 
The Court found that whether or not the EPA adhered to its Policies, it had followed 
a ‘staged process’61 to reach its conclusion and recommend approval of the proposal. 
This it had done in accordance with the Administrative Procedures, including 
approval of the proponent’s Environmental Scoping Document and the Public 
Environmental Review. The Court held that the unreasonableness claim had not been 
established and was therefore dismissed. 
 
3 Failure to Ask the Required Question 
The respondents claimed that the question that the EPA should have asked was 
whether the proposal ‘ought not to be implemented at all.’62 They asserted that this 
question arose due to the critical nature of the environmental assets in question and 
that it should be resolved prior to any consideration of the use of offsets. 
 
The primary judge had dismissed this claim on the basis of statutory construction. He 
found that the existence of the power to conditionally approve a proposal with 
attendant requirements for the utilisation of environmental offsets, necessarily 
inferred that there would be: 
a class of proposals in respect of which the issue of environmental acceptability is 
inextricably tied up with issues with respect to the conditions and procedures which can and 
should be attached to implementation of the proposal.63 
                                                 
60 Ibid [73]. 
61 Ibid 216-7 [82]. 
62 Ibid 217 [83]. 
63 Ibid [84]. 
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The Court also rejected this claim on the basis that this was, in fact, the wrong 
question to ask; and that it was based upon an incorrect belief that the Assessment 
Report assumed that the project would be implemented. The Court held that the 
correct question was ‘whether the significant residual adverse impacts on critical 
assets are so significant as to be environmentally unacceptable’.64 It found that this 
question had been answered and that the concern regarding the purported 
presumption in the Assessment Report was unfounded when the entire approval 
process was considered. 
C The Judgment 
 
The Court reviewed in detail the reasoning of Martin CJ that the EPA was required 
to consider its own published policies in order for it to exercise its jurisdiction 
validly in recommending approval of a proposal to the Minister. It held that the 
‘express provisions of the EPA Act leave no room for an implication that the 
Policies, or any of them, are mandatory relevant considerations’65 in that process. 
First and foremost the EPA Act expressly defines Approved Policies as relevant 
considerations in Part III. Such policies are developed through a lengthy and 
complex process and are finally approved by the Minister. The policies in question in 
this case were not policies promulgated through that process but by the EPA itself. 
The Court held that it was ‘inconceivable that the legislature intended the EPA to 
have the power to make its own policies on the same matters’66 and to be required to 
take them into consideration when assessing a proposal under s 44 of the EPA Act. 
Secondly, the EPA is established as an independent expert body which has the role 
of conducting environmental assessments of proposals as defined in the EPA Act and 
                                                 
64 Ibid 218 [88]. 
65 Ibid 212 [54]. 
66 Ibid 212 [56]. 
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s 44 in particular. This necessarily implies that the EPA is conducting ‘an evaluative 
and advisory function, not exercising a discretionary power.’67 
 
Thirdly, the EPA is largely unfettered in determining the parameters and procedures 
for any environmental review subject to compliance with the EPA Act and any 
relevant Ministerial direction given in accordance with s 43. Other matters which are 
contra indicators to a requirement that the EPA’s own policies are mandatory 
relevant considerations include the ‘inevitable delays, costs, prejudice and 
inconvenience’68 that would arise. There is also the fact that the EPA Act specifies 
the matters that must be considered as mandatory relevant considerations, among 
which its policies are not listed. 
 
Ultimately the Court held that the policies were permissive relevant considerations 
and not mandatory relevant considerations. 
 
IV CONCLUSION 
The judgment of the Court of Appeal of the Supreme Court of Western Australia in 
Jacob has confirmed that the EPA is not mandatorily required to consider certain of 
its published policies when making environmental assessment decisions under the 
EPA Act.69 This judgment applies specifically to the EPA and the administrative 
procedures that it effects in conducting its assessments. 
                                                 
67 Ibid 213 [59]. 
68 Ibid [57]. 
69 Marshall McKenna, Guy Greer and Claudia Henfry, The Roe 8 Saga: The Government Succeeds on 
Appeal (18 July 2016) Gilbert + Tobin Lawyers <https://www.gtlaw.com.au/?q=roe-8-saga-
government-succeeds-appeal>. 
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The decision does not abrogate the need for the EPA to act in accordance with 
policies approved under the EPA Act.70 Similarly, other government department or 
statutory body decision-makers must be aware of and act in accordance with any 
respective legislated policies. 
 
One positive outcome of this dispute has been that the Government has conducted a 
comprehensive review of the way the EPA carries out its functions.71 This review72 is 
likely to have been replicated in other government departments and statutory bodies 
in order to preclude a repeat of the lengthy challenge that the Roe 8 project became. 
It should be noted that the respondents were refused special leave to appeal to the 
High Court because the Court concluded that there were ‘insufficient prospects’ of 
success.73  
                                                 
70 Ibid. 
71 Peter Lochore, ‘Court of Appeal overturns Save Beeliar’ on Peter Lochore, The Blog (15 July 2016) 
<https://www.peterlochore.com.au/2016/07/court-appeal-overturns-save-beeliar/>. 
72 Environmental Protection Authority, Independent Legal and Governance Review into Policies and 
Guidelines for Environmental Impact Assessments under the Environmental Protection Act 1986 (WA) 
( 17 May 2016) The Government of Western Australia 
<http://www.epa.wa.gov.au/AbouttheEPA/abouttheEPA/Documents/EPA%20Legal%20and%20Gove
rnance%20Review%20-%20Final%20Report%20-%20Quinlan%20et%20al-170516.pdf>. 
73 Transcript of Proceedings, Save Beeliar Wetlands (Inc) v Jacob [2016] HCATrans 313 (16 
December 2016). 
